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Abstract
Humans routinely confront the following key question
which could be viewed as a probabilistic variant of the
controllability problem: While faced with an uncertain
environment governed by causal structures, how should
they practice their autonomy by intervening on driver
variables, in order to increase (or decrease) the proba-
bility of attaining their desired (or undesired) state for
some target variable? In this paper, for the first time,
the problem of probabilistic controllability in Causal
Bayesian Networks (CBNs) is studied. More specifi-
cally, the aim of this paper is two-fold: (i) to intro-
duce and formalize the problem of probabilistic struc-
tural controllability in CBNs, and (ii) to identify a suf-
ficient set of driver variables for the purpose of proba-
bilistic structural controllability of a generic CBN. We
also elaborate on the nature of minimality the identified
set of driver variables satisfies. In this context, the term
“structural” signifies the condition wherein solely the
structure of the CBN is known.
Introduction
The aptitude to perceive causation plays a central role in hu-
man cognition. Intervention, as a defining feature of humans
to manifest their autonomy, is the sole means of actively (in
contrast with the passive mode of being a mere observer) in-
teracting with a world governed by causal structures. Among
possible intentions behind exerting intervention, the notion
of “control” is a notable one—that is, informally speaking,
to manipulate some variables1 (also called driver variables)
of a system to, either directly or indirectly, “shape”, “guide”,
or “control” variables of the system which are of interest.
In this work, the problem of Targeted Probabilistic Struc-
tural controllability (TPS-controllability) in the context of
Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs) is addressed and formal-
ized. The term ‘structural’ signifies the condition wherein
the agent is equipped merely with the causal structure of the
domain under study. The term ‘targeted’, on the other hand,
emphasizes that the agent is interested in controlling the be-
havior of a specific subset (or all) of variables in the domain
†The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, McGill University.
1The terms “node” and “variable” will be used interchangeably
throughout.
called target variables. Finally, the term ‘probabilistic’ high-
lights the probabilistic nature of the problem under study.
At a high level, we define the problem of probabilistic
controllability in the context of CBNs as follows: How an
agent, provided with the knowledge of the set of interven-
able variables, should devise her intervention, i.e., (Q.1)
“which” variables to intervene on, and (Q.2) “how” to in-
tervene on those, so as to “control” the behavior of a par-
ticular variable(s) of interest in the domain (represented by
a CBN), that is, to maximize/minimize the probability of the
occurrence of a state of interest for a set of target variables.
The problem of probabilistic structural controllability in
the context of CBNs is then accordingly defined as that
of probabilistic controllability—as stated above—with one
crucial additional constraint on the agent’s part: The agent is
solely equipped with the knowledge of the underlying causal
structure of the domain (i.e., the CBN’s topology) and is un-
informed of the parametrization thereof. In this work, we
aim at identifying the minimal set of intervenable variables
sufficient for TPS-controllability of an arbitrary CBN. Par-
ticularly, we devise an algorithm, C∗, which identifies a suf-
ficient set of intervenable variables for the purpose of TPS-
controllability of a generic CBN. We also elaborate on the
nature of minimality the identified set satisfies. Furthermore,
to formalize the problem under study and to articulate the
results, along the way: (i) we devise, building upon Pearl’s
concept of stochastic policy (cf. (Pearl 2000), Sec. 4.2), a
graphical representation of a generic intervention policy, and
(ii) put forth a hierarchical construct for intervention policies
wherein moving up in the hierarchy amounts to empowering
the agent to exercise more advanced forms of intervention.
The question of interest to this work has significant rami-
fications for studies on strategic planning and policy making
in domains enjoying causal structure. Equally importantly,
the problem under study has notable connections to how hu-
mans, at the computational level of analysis (Marr 1982) and
in line with the rational analysis approach (Anderson 1990),
devise their intervention strategies efficiently to increase the
odds of attaining their desired goals while faced with their
uncertain environment.
Notation and Terminology
In this section, we present some preliminary notations and
terminologies which will be adopted in this paper. Random
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
01
88
5v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 7 
De
c 2
01
5
quantities are denoted by bold-faced letters; their realiza-
tions are denoted by the same letter but non-bold. More
specifically, Random Variables (RVs) are denoted by lower-
case bold-faced letters, e.g., x, and their realizations by non-
bold lower-case letters, e.g., x. Likewise, sets of RVs are
denoted by bold-faced calligraphic letters, e.g.,X , and their
corresponding realizations by non-bold calligraphic letters,
e.g., X . Val(·) denotes the set of possible values a random
quantity can take on. To simplify presentation, we incur
the following abuse of notation: We denote the probabil-
ity P(x = x) by P(x) for some RV x and its realization
x ∈ Val(x). For conditional probabilities, we will use the
notation P(x|y) instead of P(x = x|y = y). Likewise,
P(X|Y) := P(X = X|Y = Y) for X ∈ Val(X ) and
Y ∈ Val(Y). Random quantities are assumed to be discrete,
throughout, unless stated otherwise.
Throughout the paper, the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
G = (V,E) characterizes the non-intervened causal
structure of the domain where V denotes the set of
nodes/variables and E denotes the set of edges. We adopt
Pearl’s notation do(x) := do(x = x) to denote an atomic
intervention on x so as to force it to take on value x. Also,
ip(x) denotes the intervention policy to be adopted for x the
meaning of which will be clarified in the subsequent section;
informally intervention policy refers to how the agent de-
cides to manipulate the intervened variable (cf. (Pearl 2000),
Sec. 4.2). Intervention policy may or may not functionally
depend on other variables of the domain. As we will see
later, intervention policy in its most generic form is nothing
but a Conditional Probability Distribution (CPD). δ(·) de-
notes the Kronecker delta function. Also, Backward Chain-
ing (BC) on a variable refers to the simple process of identi-
fying its parents (i.e., immediate causes) and the parents of
the parents and so forth until the boundaries of the CBN are
reached.
Before proceeding further, let us formally define two key
notions, namely, subsumability and domination.
Def. (Subsumability): DAG G1 = (V1, E1) subsumes
DAG G2 = (V2, E2), denoted in short by G1 ⊇ G2, iff
V1 = V2 and E2 ⊆ E1. We refer to the set E1 \ E2, as the
surplus of G1 with respect to G2.
Def. (Domination): DAG G1 = (V1, E1) dominates
DAG G2 = (V2, E2), denoted by G1 < G2, iff there ex-
ists a parametrization of G1 which yields a result for the
objective of interest that is no worse than the best achiev-
able by any possible parametrizations of G2. For instance,
if the objective of interest is to maximize the probability of
some event of interest, say r = r for some r ∈ Val(r), then
we write G1 < G2 iff there exists a parametrization of G1
which yields some value for the probability of interest, P(r),
which is greater than or equal to the best achievable by any
possible parametrizations of G2.
Lemma 1. (Domination vs Subsumability): Let G1, G2
be DAGs. Then, G1 ⊇ G2 ⇒ G1 < G2.
Proof: The proof is straightforward once we realize that
one can very well take advantage of the extra edges of G1
with respect to G2 (i.e., the surplus of G1 with respect to
G2) which give one more “degrees of freedom” to entertain
and hence to achieve a result which is equally good or better
than the best achievable by all possible parametrizations of
G2 in terms of the objective of interest. 
In subsequent sections where we introduce potential ob-
jectives of interest, the above statements become clearer.
Motivating Example
To develop some intuition as to the problem under study, a
series of informative examples will be presented.
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Figure 1: Motivating example.
Let us first consider the CBN depicted in Fig. 1(a). Vari-
ables y1, y2 are amenable to intervention (or, in short, in-
tervenable). Let us assume that the objective is to make the
occurrence of the event o = o ∈ Val(o) as likely as possible
through intervening on any subset of variables {y1, y2} (or
to choose not to intervene at all corresponding to choosing
the empty set). The key question is how, by mere investi-
gation of the structure of the CBN depicted in Fig. 1(a), to
decide: (i) on which (intervenable) variable(s) to intervene,
and (ii) how the intervention should be exercised (a notion
referred to as Intervention Policy (IP)). It is easy to come
to the conclusion that, to make the occurrence of o = o as
likely as possible, one needs to just intervene on y1 and force
it into the state y1 = y∗1 where y∗1 is the realization for y1
conditioned on which the probability of event o = o is max-
imum, i.e., y∗1 = arg maxy1∈Val(y1) P(o|y1).
It is crucial to realize then that, due to the structure of the
CBN depicted in Fig. 1(a), and regardless of its parametriza-
tion, it suffices for the agent to solely intervene on y1 for
the purpose of TPS-controllability of o = o (the answer to
(i)). Furthermore, since the agent is assumed to be equipped
merely with the structure of the underlying CBN and not
the paramterization thereof, based on the above argument
on y1’s IP, the agent can just arrive at the conclusion that
y1’s IP has the functional (or structural) form of2 P(y1)—
that is, merely the non-parametric form of the IP (the an-
swer to (ii)). Altogether, a solution to the problem of TPS-
controllability of o = o is {y1} (which is a sufficient set
of variables to be intervened) along with P(y1) which is
the functional form of y1’s IP. Following the same line
of reasoning for the CBNs depicted in Figs. 1(b-d), it is
straightforward to argue that {y1} is a sufficient set for TPS-
2In fact, the agent can reason out one step further and come
to the conclusion that y1’s IP must have the functional form
of P(y1) = δ(y1 = y
∗), however, the agent cannot iden-
tify/specify the value of y∗—due to the lack of knowledge about
the paramtrization of the CBN.
controllability of the target variable o, and y1’s IP has the
functional form of P(y1) akin to what we had for Fig. 1(a).
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Figure 2: Motivating example.
Let us consider another example that highlights a key
idea, namely, that we need to broaden our understanding of
the notion of intervention (cf. (Pearl 2000), Sec. 4.2). Con-
sider the CBN depicted in Fig. 2. This time, only y is in-
tervenable. Assume that (only for this particular example),
all the variables are binary-valued; the prior probability on x
is P(x) (which is assumed to be non-degenerate), y := ¬x,
and o := x ⊕ y where ¬ and ⊕ denote the logical connec-
tives not and xor, respectively. It is easy to verify that the
event o = 1 occurs with probability one, regardless of the
choice of P(x). For the problem of TPS-controllability of
o = 1, the agent has to decide whether or not to intervene
on y. Imagine an intervention were to be exercised on y.
Whether the agent would set y = 0, or y = 1, the objective
event of o = 1 would become less likely to happen com-
pared to that of the (non-intervened) original model. At first
glance, the fact that exercising intervention makes the situa-
tion worse in terms of the objective of interest seems rather
counter-intuitive. How could it be that having the freedom to
manipulate variable y (which even happens to be one of the
parents of the objective node) whatever way we like does
not allow you to outperform the (non-intervened) original
model? The answer lies in developing a better understand-
ing of the term “whatever way we like.” For that purpose,
we need to broaden our conception of the notion of inter-
vention and go beyond practicing merely a primitive atomic
form of intervention denoted by do(y = y) in the litera-
ture. A more advanced form of intervention is to pick the
state to which we want to force the intervened variable as a
function of the states of some other variables of the domain.
That is, IP may depend functionally on a collection of other
variables in the domain. In this example, choosing y’s IP, de-
noted by ip(y), to functionally depend on (the state of) vari-
able x ensures that, the outcome achieved by exerting such
intervention, is equally good or better (no worse than) than
that of the (non-intervened) original model. In such a set-
ting, we simply adopt the following terminology/notation:
The intervention pair (y, ip(y) := P(y|x)) (comprising, in
order, of the set of intervened variables and their correspond-
ing IPs) is equally good or better than both: (i) the interven-
tion pair (y, ip(y) := P(y) = δ(y = y)) corresponding
to the simplistic atomic form of intervention on y discussed
above which does not depend on the state of x and, like-
wise, (ii) the intervention pair (∅,∅) corresponding to the
original model (without intervention). A simple comparison
between the CBN in Fig. 1(a) and the one in Fig. 2 reveals
the following: Had there been left, upon intervening on y, no
paths through which x’s causal effect on the objective vari-
able o could be mediated, there would be no need for the
intervention policy of y to functionally depend on x (akin to
Fig. 1(a)).
Intervention Policy
The notion of IP delineates how an intervened variable
should be “manipulated.” More specifically, IP indicates
whether other variables play any role or not (and if so, how)
in devising how the manipulation on a to-be-intervened vari-
able is to be practiced. It is intuitive that the more variables
we are allowed to functionally depend on while devising
the IP of a to-be-intervened variable, the more “degrees of
freedom” we have in controlling the behavior of the to-be-
intervened variable. Next, we will formalize this intuition
by, first, putting forward a simple graphical representation
of intervention policy and, then, by using the idea of sub-
sumability which draws on the fact that the original non-
intervened model could be thought of as a special case of
the intervened model. By allowing a larger number of vari-
ables for the IP of an intervened variable to functionally de-
pend on, we show that IPs can be organized in a hierarchical
construct wherein moving up in the hierarchy amounts to
empowering the agent to exercise more sophisticated forms
of intervention.
Hierarchical Construct
Before proceeding further let us make a definition: The
scope of an IP is the set of variables, except the intervened
variable itself, that the IP functionally depends on. For in-
stance, for ip(y) := P(y|s), the scope is comprised of the
variable s. In short, the idea of organizing IPs into a hierar-
chical construct is inspired by the simple realization that,
by delimiting the set of variables the agent is allowed to
incorporate into the scope of the intervened variable’s IP
(functionally represented by a conditional probability dis-
tribution), we impose a constraint on the expressive power
of the intervention policy.
The following notation henceforth will be employed to
refer to different IP-classes:
• IP class-0: This class refers to the set of IPs where the
scope of each is the empty set, i.e., a setting wherein the
IP(s) of the intervened variable(s) is not allowed to incorpo-
rate any variables into its scope. That is, if variable x hap-
pens to be decided to be intervened and the agent is only per-
mitted to adopt class-0 intervention policies, then, the agent
is just allowed to place IP of the functional form P(x) on
x to exercise her intervention. It is crucial to note that, the
agent is allowed to parameterize P(x) as she wishes, yet the
functional form of the IP is constrained.
• IP class-1: This class refers to the set of IPs where
the scope of each comprises the immediate causes of the
corresponding intervened variable. That is, in this class,
the IP of the intervened variable x has the functional form
ip(x) := P(x|par(x)) where par(x) is the set of immediate
causes for x. That is, the scope of class-1 IP ip(x) is par(x).
• IP class-j,∀j ≥ 2: This class refers to the set of IPs
where the scope of each is the ancestors of the correspond-
ing intervened variable up to ith level. For instance, for the
case of IP class-2, IP(s) of the intervened variable(s) is solely
allowed to take into account the state of (i) the immediate
causes, and (2) the immediate causes of the variables in (i),
thereby, altogether functionally depending on all the ances-
tors up to the 2nd level.
• IP class-∞: This class refers to the set of IPs where
the scope of each is all the ancestors of the corresponding
intervened variable. Note that the complete set of ancestors
of a variable x can be found by instantiating the BC on x.
Finally, it is crucial to notice the following. For an IP to be
in a particular class amounts to imposing a constraint solely
on the functional form of the IP; the agent is free to choose
any parametrization for the IP as she may wish. Therefore,
ip(x) ∈ class-i simply means that the functional form of
ip(x) is constrained in accord to the definition of IP class-i
given above, yet, it could be arbitrarily parameterized. Also,
assuming that X = {xi}mi=1, the notation ip(X ) ∈ class-j
will be adopted as a shorthand for the following: ip(xi) ∈
class-j,∀i = 1, · · · ,m.
Graphical Representation
In this section, we develop a way of visualizing IPs. The idea
is simple. If the IP of a to-be-intervened variable x happens
to functionally depend on y, then we show this by a directed
dash-dotted arrow emanating from y and pointing towards x.
To ensure that any practice of intervention is fully expressed
by such edges we introduce the following convention: For
DAG G = (V,E), a clamped variable C is added3 to V .
Then, intervening on a variable a which has no parents and
exerting ip(a) = P(a) will be illustrated graphically by a
dash-dotted edge emanating from C towards a. In general,
upon y taking on the state y, the agent may decide to set the
value of x to a fixed value x (deterministic IP), or to set the
value of x probabilistically (stochastic IPs), i.e., x takes on
values from Val(x) according to some conditional probabil-
ity distribution P(x|y). In both cases, ip(x) is said to func-
tionally depend on variable y. Simply put, in devising the in-
tervention policy of x, namely, ip(x), the state of y is taken
into account. The notion of probabilistic IP is discussed in
((Pearl 2000), pp. 113-114) under the title of stochastic pol-
icy.
Let us first give some definitions which will prove useful
in the subsequent sections. For the given definitions, DAG
G = (V,E) represents the causal structure of the domain.
Def. (Intervention Pair): A set of intervened variables
K ⊆ V along with their corresponding IPs comprise a pair,
called an intervention pair, which is denoted by (K, ip(K)).
Def. (Intervention DAG (i-DAG)): Every intervention
pair (K, ip(K)) for K ⊆ V uniquely specifies a DAG
(as described above) which we refer to as the i-DAG as-
sociated to that intervention pair. The i-DAG associated to
(K, ip(K)) is denoted by (K, ip(K))G.
Def. (i-Subsumability): For X ,Y ⊆ V , i-DAG
(X , ip(X ))G i-subsumes i-DAG (Y , ip(Y))G, denoted
in short by (X , ip(X ))G ⊇i (Y , ip(Y))G, iff (i)
3It is implicitly assumed throughout this paper that the variable
C has been added to DAG G a priori. Also, we will not depict C in
the figures unless needed.
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Figure 3: Sample case. (a): Original CBN. Variable y is to be
intervened according to ip(y) := P(y|u). (b): The graphical
representation of intervening on y with ip(y) := P(y|u).
The figure simply illustrates the fact that the state of y gets
decided (potentially probabilistically) according to the state
of u. Notice that according to (Pearl 2000), upon intervening
on y, all the incoming edges into y should be removed.
(X , ip(X ))G ⊇ (Y , ip(Y))G, (ii) the set of the dash-dotted
edges in (Y , ip(Y))G is a subset of the set of the dash-dotted
edges in (X , ip(X ))G, and (iii) the surplus of (X , ip(X ))G
with respect to (Y , ip(Y))G is solely comprised of dash-
dotted edges.
Def. (i-Domination): For X ,Y ⊆ V , i-DAG
(X , ip(X ))G i-dominates i-DAG (Y , ip(Y))G, denoted by
(X , ip(X ))G <i (Y , ip(Y))G for short, iff there exist a
parameterization for the dash-dotted edges (see Fig. 3) in
(X , ip(X ))G which yields a result for the objective of inter-
est that is no worse than the best achievable by any pos-
sible parametrizations of the dash-dotted edges in i-DAG
(Y , ip(Y))G.
Lemma 2. (i-Domination vs i-Subsumability): Let
DAG G = (V,E) characterize the causal structure of the
domain. Let (X , ip(X ))G and (Y , ip(Y))G be two i-DAGs
for some X ,Y ⊆ V . Then, the following holds:
(X , ip(X ))G ⊇i (Y, ip(Y))G ⇒ (X , ip(X ))G <i (Y, ip(Y))G.
Proof: The rationale is similar to the one presented for
Lemma 1. 
It immediately follows (due to Lemma 2) that, for G =
(V,E) and ∀K ⊆ V , the following holds true: ∀j ≥ m,
(K, ip(K) ∈ class-j)G <i (K, ip(K) ∈ class-m)G.
TPS-Controllability of CBNs: Formalization
Let DAG G = (V,E) characterize the causal structure of
the domain. Let V = Vi ∪ V¯i where Vi denotes the set of
nodes/variables amenable to intervention (or, in short, in-
tervenable), and V¯i be the complement of Vi, i.e., V¯i =
V \ Vi. The probability of interest, in its generic form
takes the form4 P(O = O|do[X ; ip(X ) = ip(X )]), or
in short P(O|do[X ; ip(X )]), where O denotes the set of
target variables, O denotes the realization of interest, X
denotes the set of intervened variables, ip(X ) denotes the
functional form (i.e., non-parametric representation) of the
to-be-adopted intervention policy, and ip(X ) denotes a spe-
cific parametrization5 of ip(X ). Also, do[X ; ip(X )] de-
4The connection to Pearl’s notation for do-calculus is as follows
(cf. (Pearl 2000), p. 114): P(y)|P∗(x|z) = P(y|do[x;P∗(x|z)]).
5Which is equivalent to a specific parametrization of the dash-
dotted edges representing the intervention policy exercised on vari-
notes the setting wherein variablesX are intervened accord-
ing to ip(X ) (functional form) and, likewise, do[X ; ip(X )]
denotes the setting wherein variables X are intervened ac-
cording to ip(X ) = ip(X ). One can write, O = Oi ∪ O¯i
where Oi ⊆ Vi and O¯i ⊆ V¯i. Objectives of interest could
have any of the following forms:
min
X⊆Vi
(
min
ip(X )∈class-∞
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
, (1)
max
X⊆Vi
(
max
ip(X )∈class-∞
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
, (2)
and,
min
X⊆Vi
(
max
ip(X )∈class-∞
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
, (3)
max
X⊆Vi
(
min
ip(X )∈class-∞
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
. (4)
In the sequel, we focus on objectives (1) and (2). The dis-
cussion on objectives (3) and (4) is deferred to the end of the
paper. Therefore, whenever we use the statement “objective
of interest” we are specifically referring to both of objectives
(1) and (2) unless stated otherwise.
Next, we devise an algorithm, C∗, for the problem of TPS-
controllability of CBNs. C∗ outputs a set of intervenable
variables, X ∗, which is “optimal” with respect to objectives
(1) and (2). In other words,X ∗ is a sufficient choice of vari-
ables to intervene on (according to IP class-∞) to satisfy
objectives (1) and (2). To put it formally, in the next section
we show that for X ∗ the following holds: ∀Y ⊆ Vi,
(X ∗, ip(X ∗) ∈ class-∞)G <i (Y , ip(Y) ∈ class-∞)G.
TPS-Controllability of CBNs: Algorithm C∗
Let us explain simply how C∗ works. BC has to be initiated
on nodes inO. Upon reaching any node in Vi, the BC execu-
tion path terminates at that node. This procedure continues
until, for all of the BC execution paths, either: (i) The BC
execution path gets terminated at some node belonging to
Vi, or (ii) a node with no parents is reached. The set of in-
tervenable variables at which BC terminates constitute C∗’s
output denoted by X ∗. Fig. 4 depicts a sample execution of
C∗.
Algorithm C∗: Justification
On the Sufficiency of X ∗: Let us now present the suffi-
ciency proof for X ∗ where by sufficiency we mean that:
intervening (according to IP class-∞) on any variables in
addition to X ∗ does not yield any improvement upon what
is achievable through merely intervening (according to IP
class-∞) on X ∗.
Notice that we can write Vi = V BCi ∪ V¯ BCi where V BCi
is the set of intervenable variables which belong to the sub-
graph generated by executing BC on the target nodesO. It is
obvious that intervening on any variable in V¯ BCi is pointless
ablesX in the corresponding i-DAG (see Fig. 3).
o
t1 t2t3
t5 t4
Figure 4: Sample Case: Variable o (depicted in red) is the tar-
get variable. The intervenable variables (i.e., members of Vi)
are circled. The BC execution paths are colored in blue and
illustrated by dash-dotted lines. Upon initiating the BC at
the target variable o, we arrive at the t1 (depicted in purple)
located at the junction. Next, we arrive at t2 and t3. Since
t3 ∈ Vi, the BC terminates at t3. On the other hand, since
t2 6∈ Vi, the BC continues. Having performed the BC on
t2, we arrive at t4 and t5. Since t4 ∈ Vi, the BC terminates
on t4. At the end, since t5 (depicted in grey) has no parents
(immediate causes), the BC terminates at t5 as well. There-
fore, by mere investigation of the structure, C∗ outputs the
set X ∗ = {t3, t4} as a solution to the objectives (2) and (1)
for this particular setting (i.e., the given CBN and the corre-
sponding Vi and o as the target variable).
due to the following argument6: (?) variables in V¯ BCi have
no direct or indirect causal effect on any of the target nodes.
Now, what is left to be shown is why, among all V BCi , it
suffices to intervene on X ∗ (according to IP class-∞) and,
why, intervening on any additional variables does not im-
prove upon what is achievable through intervening merely
on X ∗. More formally, the question is why the following
holds: ∀Y ⊆ V BCi
(X ∗, ip(X ∗) ∈ class-∞)G <i (Y , ip(Y) ∈ class-∞)G.
Notice that, the extension to the case of ∀Y ⊆ Vi imme-
diately follows from argument (?). The realization of the
fact that variable y ∈ V BCi was not selected (for interven-
tion) by C∗ implies that y’s causal effect on the target vari-
ables which are descendant7 of y must have been mediated
through some of the selected nodes by C∗ say Y† ⊆ X ∗
(otherwise, y would have been selected). The claim as to
the redundancy of further intervening on y in addition to ex-
erting intervention (according to IP class-∞) on Y† is as
follows. Let G = (V,E) be the DAG associated to the (non-
intervened) underlying causal structure of the domain. First,
notice that the effect of stochastic policies can be expressed
in terms of atomic interventions in G as explained in ((Pearl
2000), pp. 113-114) and ((Pearl 1995), p. 684). Due to Rule
2 of Pearl’s do-calculus, intervention on y can be exchanged
with y being merely passively observed. Subsequently, due
to Rule 1 of Pearl’s do-calculus, y’s observation can be dis-
missed. Notice that intervening onY† according to IP class-
6This statement immediately follows from Rule 3 of Pearl’s do-
calculus (cf. (Pearl 2000), p. 95).
7Intervening on y, obviously, could merely influence y’s de-
scendant.
∞ (which amounts to incorporating all the ancestors of Y†
into their IPs) renders y d-separated from the target variables
which are descendant of8 y, hence the applicability of Rule
2 and Rule 1. This concludes the proof.
On the Minimality of X ∗
Let us present two definitions and a proposition which bears
on the minimality of X ∗.
Def. (Locally Structurally Minimal (LSM)): C∗’s output,
X ∗, is LSM with respect to DAG G iff there exists a
parametrization of G such that no proper subset of X ∗,
namely, X ∗∗, exists for which the following holds:
(X ∗∗, ip(X ∗∗) ∈ class-∞)G <i (X ∗, ip(X ∗) ∈ class-∞)G.
Def. (Uniformly Structurally Minimal (USM)): C∗’s output,
X ∗, is USM iff X ∗ is LSM with respect to any DAG G.
Proposition 1. X ∗ is USM with respect to objective (1).
Proof: The proof is constructive. The objective of inter-
est is maximax given in (1). Let us assume, without loss of
generality, that all the RVs are binary-valued and the desired
state is for all the target variables to take on value one. Our
goal is to parameterize an arbitraryG in such a way that: (i)
the desired state happens with probability one if variables
X ∗ are all set to one through exerting atomic interventions,
and (ii) the desired state happens with probability zero oth-
erwise. Start atX ∗. Parameterize the CPD of each x∗ ∈ X ∗
such that it always takes on the value zero. Moving along
the BC execution paths terminated at X ∗, proceed towards
the target variables which are descendants9 of X ∗. Along
the way, parameterize the CPD associated to any variable
k such that, conditioned on k’s parents which are descen-
dants ofX ∗ (denoted by parX∗(k)), k takes on value one iff
all parX∗(k) take value one10. In other words, intermediate
variables like k work as an and logical gate. Proceed in the
aforementioned manner until all the target variables (which
are descendants of X ∗) are reached. It is easy to verify that
indeed the desired state happens with probability one iff all
the variablesX ∗ are set to one and, furthermore, intervening
on any proper subset of X ∗ in any way does not yield such
an outcome. This concludes the proof. 
On Minimax/Maximin Objectives
In this section we claim that, subject to the constraint that
the IP’s of the to-be-intervened variables has to belong to IP
class-j, the solution to both minimax and maximin problem
is the empty set, for all j ≥ 1. Let us present a lemma using
which it is easy to justify the claim made above.
Lemma 3. Let DAG G = (V,E) represent the causal
structure of the domain. ∀j ≥ 1 and ∀X ⊆ Vi, the following
8Incorporation of all the antecedents of Y† into their IPs guar-
antees that all the back-door paths from y to the target variables
which are descendant of y are blocked (cf. (Pearl 2000), Sec. 3.3.1).
9For any target variable q which is not a descendant of X ∗,
parameterize P(q|par(q)) such that q takes the value 1 with prob-
ability one.
10In other words, the CPD of P(k|par(k)) is paremeterized in
such a manner that the parents of k which are not descendants of
X ∗ are rendered ineffective.
inequalities hold:
min
ip(X )∈class-j
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )]) ≤ P(O),
P(O) ≤ max
ip(X )∈class-j
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )]).
The proof for Lemma 3 is straightforward due to the simple
realization that, ∀j ≥ 1, (X , ip(X ) ∈ class-j)G i-subsumes
the original CBN, thus (X , ip(X ) ∈ class-j)G <i (∅,∅)G,
∀j ≥ 1. Using Lemma 3, it is easy to justify the claim we
made earlier as to the solution to the minimax and maximin
problems; the solution to both is the empty set. For details,
the reader is referred to Appendix.
Related Work
In this section, we give an overview of the ideas explored in
the literature which are, in spirit, related to the problem un-
der study in this work. The idea of Structure Control Theory
(SCT) proposed by Lin (Lin 1974) in the context of Linear
Time-Invariant (LTI) systems governed by first-order differ-
ential equations (a.k.a. state equations) perhaps comes clos-
est to our problem. In such domains, all variables are deter-
ministic and the states of variables change in time according
to the dynamics represented by state equations.
Authors in (Liu, Slotine, and Baraba´si 2011), drawing
on the idea of SCT proposed by Lin (Lin 1974), aim at
identifying the minimal set of variables which are suffi-
cient for the purpose of structural controllability of a generic
large-scale LTI system. In a subsequent work, authors in
(Gao et al. 2014), relax the objective of structural control-
lability of the system in whole, to merely that of a par-
ticular set of desired variables called target variables. This
line of thought has been motivated due to the understand-
ing that in large-scale systems, it may neither be attain-
able nor required to control the full system but, rather,
to merely control a subset of the variables of the system
(analogous to target variables in our problem) which are
deemed pivotal for the realization of the task at hand. In
this light, (Gao et al. 2014) is concerned with the very
same question underlying our work, yet, perusing it in radi-
cally different settings. In (Liu, Slotine, and Baraba´si 2011;
Gao et al. 2014) both variables and their inter-connections
are deterministic in nature whereas, in our case, both have
probabilistic natures; a point of departure which leads to a
substantially different line of work—both semantically and
syntactically.
Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time, the problem of TPS-
controllability in the context of CBNs was investigated and
formalized. Algorithm C∗ was devised to identify a suffi-
cient set of intervenable variables for the purpose of TPS-
controllability of a generic CBN; the minimality of C∗’s out-
put was also characterized. The provided results can have
significant ramifications for studies on strategic planning
and policy making allowing one to efficiently practice her
interventions in order to maximize (minimize) the odds of
the desired (undesired) outcomes.
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Appendix
On Minimax/Maximin Objectives: Details Using
Lemma 3 in the paper, the next inequalities follows. ∀j ≥ 1,
max
X⊆Vi
(
min
ip(X )∈class-j
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
≤ P(O),
P(O) ≤ min
X⊆Vi
(
max
ip(X )∈class-j
P(O|do[X ; ip(X )])
)
.
One can readily conclude from the above inequalities the
claim made in the paper as to the solution to the minimax
and maximin problems; the solution to both is the empty
set.
Minimality ofX ∗ for Minimin Objective We present the
result in a form of a proposition.
Proposition A.1: Let DAG G = (V,E) characterize the
causal structure of the domain and Oi 6= ∅. Any set {o∗}
where o∗ ∈ Oi is a solution to the minimin objective given
in (2).
Proof: Setting o∗ ∈ Oi to any value other than the
desired one simply renders the desired event O = O
impossible which subsequently yields value zero for the
minimin objective. This concludes the proof. 
On the Connection to Psychology
Algorithm C∗ captures one very common-sensical strategy
an individual (referred to as the agent throughout in the pa-
per) follows while faced with the task under study: “The
closer a to-be-intervened node is to the target node(s), the
better.” That is, there exists this tendency to intervene on
the nodes which are closest11 to the target node(s). We re-
fer to this intuitive tendency as the proximity principle. In
psychology literature (Glymour 2003; Krynski and Tenen-
baum 2007), CBN is adopted as a normative model, at the
computational level of analysis (Marr 1982), to represent
and reason about causal domains. Algorithm C∗, therefore,
could be viewed as a potential proposal at Marr’s algo-
rithmic level of analysis (Marr 1982), for the problem of
how subjects devise their intervention strategies to “control”
the state of a target node. The plausibility of C∗ as a po-
tential algorithmic-level candidate is elevated due to C∗’s
capturing nicely, by its mere design (i.e., starting at target
nodes and moving backwards toward intervenable nodes),
the common-sensical proximity principle.
11The extreme case being to intervene right on the target node(s)
and set it to the desired value.
